

Core Values as Opinion Mediators of Same Sex Relationships

James Krueger

University of Wisconsin Oshkosh
Department of Political Science
Oshkosh, WI 54901
United States of America

Abstract

Prior research on multiple frame environments has employed hypothetical issues to examine the effects of individual level characteristics on public opinion. This work adds to the literature by examining attitudes toward the legal recognition of same sex relationships. It relies on a variety of framing environments which vary the direction (support or opposition for the issue) of the frames provided to a national sample of adult subjects in 2008. Results indicate that subjects in the framed environments were better able to link their issue opinions to core values when discussing same sex marriage, and that subjects agreeing with received frames improve linkages between subject values and issue opinions for both same sex marriage and civil unions.

Keywords: issue framing, same-sex marriage, experimental methods, core values

1.0 Introduction

Same-sex marriage remains a highly salient issue for the public. A recent study suggests a third of voters believe same-sex marriage is a ‘very important’ issue (Pew 2008). Both Evangelicals and Republicans are more likely to list the issue as very important compared to other voters. This evidence fits with a statement by Tom McClusky of the Family Research Council, who believes that gay marriage is a mobilizing issue for conservative voters.

“These issues [marriage and other gay rights issues] motivate the grassroots and will get the people in churches and people who care about these issues not only out to vote, but hopefully, bringing their friends along.” (Smith 2008).

Opposition specific to same-sex marriage has fluctuated over time. A number of polls have recorded the fluctuations of public opinion on same-sex marriage prior to 2004. Each shows increasingly favorable public attitudes towards the issue with strong reversals in presidential campaign years of 1996 and 2004. These reversals appear to be the result of conservative voter mobilization efforts during electoral campaigns (Lewis & Gossett 2008, 7). Since 2004, public support for same-sex civil unions has increased substantially, to approximately 49% nationwide. Opposition to a constitutional amendment barring same-sex marriages has also increased, achieving parity with support in 2008 (Buchanan 2006; Brewer 2008).

Prior work has demonstrated that multiple issue frames have an effect on subject support for policy questions. This is only half of the story, however. In order to provide a complete picture of the effect of multiple frame environments on public opinion, we must also look at how subjects receive and process the issue frames. To do so, I lay out a theory for how differences in subject value hierarchies affect frame use by subjects, and what effect these differences might have on opinion consistency across gay rights issues.

2.0 Literature Review

Although relatively few scholars have examined attitudes toward same-sex marriage using an experimental methodology, the volume of experimental research on framing effects is substantial. Traditionally, framing experiments have provided the frame as part of a survey item, and then compared the responses with those from a group who received a version of the question which did not employ a frame. More recent work moves beyond the effects of a single frame to include several frames in the question. Work by Sniderman and Theriault (2004) has laid the groundwork for a theory of frame competition—testing the impact of two opposing frames on public opinion. This work represents a challenge to the common wisdom provided by many framing experiments.

Sniderman and Theriault (2004, 41) contend that research which provides only one frame to subjects poorly mimics real politics and may make subjects' responses more pliable. Their 'competing frames' theory contends that the presentation of two opposing frames allows subjects to better link their responses to core values.

A number of scholars have built on Sniderman and Theriault's argument, suggesting that frames should be tested under multiple framing environments to better replicate politics in the real world (Chong & Druckman 2007a, 2007b, 2007b). They argue that frame competition moderates the effects of any one frame. The use of one frame would increase the salience of a particular value to a subject's response, whereas the introduction of two frames would require a subject to evaluate the importance of two values and consciously choose between them.

It is this sort of work that is largely absent from framing studies. Although Kinder and Sanders (1990) provide frames for and against affirmative action policies in their work, the majority of framing studies avoid the use of more than one frame in a given treatment condition. Sniderman and Theriault's (2004, 19) work is a reaction to this 'artificial sequestering' of citizens in studies using only one frame. Theirs is one of the first intentional studies of competing frames, to get at the argumentation underlying public debate. Recently, Chong and Druckman (2007a, 102) have expanded on the idea of competing frames, calling for experiments which employ differing numbers of frames and vary exposure to the frames. They assert that all of these conditions can be compared to unframed conditions to provide a clearer understanding of the impact of each frame under each condition.¹ These studies, they believe, will improve understanding of the importance of frame repetition and strength in affecting public opinion.

Other studies adopting the competing frames approach include Hansen's (2007) study of Danish public opinion. His national telephone survey found that the introduction of competing frames reduced the number of nonattitudes, enabled subjects to provide more consistent answers across a range of public opinion questions, and facilitated linkages between responses and core values. Among the many effects of framing an issue in terms of a core value, is the potential for the frame-core value linkage to prime citizen responses on related issues. Kinder and Sanders (1990) find that frames may not have an impact on attitudes towards the issue they discuss, but they can prime values for related issues. Although they were unable to find a difference in attitudes towards affirmative action across their framed conditions, they did see differences in subject's evaluations of other federal assistance and equal opportunity programs.

Some scholarly attention has focused on multiple, non-competing frame environments. This work examines the acceptance of one frame over another on a single side of a divisive issue, such as gun control (Haider-Markel & Joslyn 2001). The critical assumption of this work is that each frame will resonate with the public to a different degree. Frames which better resonate with the public are 'stronger' than those frames which do not resonate as well. In comparing two arguments for blame attribution following the shootings at Columbine High School, Haider-Markel and Joslyn were testing the relative strength of each frame.

More recently, attention has shifted to testing the strength of frames on opposite sides of an issue (Druckman 2006). These multiple-frame studies measure the impact of competing frames of differing strength (strong or weak) on public opinion (Chong & Druckman 2007a, 2007b). In doing so, Chong and Druckman's work extends the basic logic of multiple-frame environments. Real world public debate comes in many forms: a strong frame versus a weak one, two competing strong frames, a weak frame versus no frame at all, etc. Their work provides insight into the dynamics of frame strength and competition by exploring the effects of frames across these different environments.

To construct these divergent framing environments, Chong and Druckman rely on prior work which has examined factors inherent to the frames themselves which mediate the relative strength of a frame, its resonance with the public. Several articles focus on the credibility of the frame's source (Miller & Krosnick 2000; Chong & Druckman 2007a). One memorable study attributed given frames to Colin Powell or Jerry Springer, depending on the treatment condition; results suggested that who was transmitting the frame mattered at least as much as who was receiving it (Brewer 2001, 1052).

¹ By unframed condition I mean that the experiment does not provide an explicit frame within the treatment question. Since each of these issues is subject to framing by elites, subjects are likely to bring an unspoken or pre-existing frame from public discourse to the experiment.

Finally, how the frames are presented, apart from the source and subject characteristics may also play a role. Joslyn and Haider-Markel (2002) stress that the medium of communication for frames, in addition to their content, and the predispositions of frame recipients can mediate frame effects.

Among the questions of recent interest in experimental studies are: What effects do multiple frame environments have on public opinion? How do both frame specific and individual-level mediating factors alter these effects? Prior work examining the impact of issue frames on public opinion suggests that the number of frames subjects are given plays an important role in their ability to link responses to core values, that is, their ability to express an opinion consistent with their self-reported ideology (Sniderman & Theriault 2004; Chong & Druckman 2007b). Framing theory as defined here is predicated then on the assumptions that a) elites are capable of simplifying complex issues into simple arguments or frames; b) that these 'frames' are disseminated to the public to gather support for a specific policy position, and do so by suggesting the importance of one value over another in reaching a decision; and c) that the public reacts to these frames through the acceptance of one position or another. Competing frames environments should enable citizens to provide more coherent responses across a range of related issues and better link these responses to core values. The result of these linkages is the reduction of measurement bias in survey responses, which in turn will provide a more accurate understanding of public opinion on the framed issues.

While the study of gay rights and same-sex marriage has expanded into a sizeable and varied literature over the past two decades, the use of experimental methods to study gay rights has remained infrequent. A welcome exception to this trend can be found in the work of Paul Brewer. In a series of articles, Brewer employs frames for and against same-sex marriage to test hypotheses on frame processing (2001), explanations of opinions (2002), and linkages between opinions and core values (2003, Brewer & Gross 2005). These articles have been updated and collected into a book, which details the many aspects of public opinion surrounding gay rights since the 1990s (Brewer 2008). His findings suggest that citizens who are more politically knowledgeable may be less susceptible to framing effects. Further, the use of frames can influence the language subjects use to explain their opinions. Subjects in single frame conditions who received an 'equality' frame responded using an equality-based language, while those who received a 'morality' frame preferred a moral language. Finally, his limited competing frames study suggests that the presence of multiple frames may dampen framing effects, generally (Brewer 2008).

I concur with Brewer that much more can be learned about the uptake and processing of competing elite frames through an analysis of public attitudes towards same-sex marriage and civil unions. This project expands on Brewer's work by examining the importance of different frame environments on linkages between respondent core values and issue opinions.

3.0 Core Values

At their most basic level, frames attempt to raise the salience of one core value over another for a given issue. Core values are best defined as: "abstract beliefs about desirable end states or behaviors that transcend specific situations, that guide evaluation and behavior, and can be rank ordered in terms of relative importance." (Schwartz 1994, 20; see also Rokeach 1973, Jacoby 2008). These core values represent the fundamental beliefs held within a society. It is important to note, however, that the degree to which each member of a society holds a core value varies from person to person, as well as across time and issue.

Core values are acquired through the process of socialization. Therefore, individuals need not be politically sophisticated in order to receive core values (Feldman 1988, 418; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). Rather, these scholars believe that core values are the basic guidelines people use in order to make decisions. "Political evaluations may be based, in part, on the extent to which policies and actions are consistent or inconsistent with certain important beliefs and values." (Feldman 1988, 418). Feldman continues, suggesting that most individuals use core values over a complete and internally consistent ideology, which would require greater amounts of political knowledge and sophistication to employ.

Scholars have identified a wide variety of core values, based in part on the questions they seek to study. Some examples include: protecting the environment, national security, and social order (Schwartz 1992). Hansen (2007) uses liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. Others compare across categories. Pollock et al. distinguish between economic and moral core values, such as: free market versus egalitarianism and religious versus secular belief (1993; Fisher et al. 1994). A final group of scholars have contrasted traditional morality, individualism, and egalitarianism (Craig et al. 2005; Jacoby 2006, Jacoby 2008).

Several studies have explored the connection between core values and gay rights. Brewer (2003) examines the interplay of moral traditionalism and egalitarianism in media coverage of gay rights issues. His analysis of 1992 and 1996 ANES data suggests that the number of frames (each representing a core value) present in public debate can reduce differences opinion between subjects with differing amounts of political knowledge. Other studies of attitudes toward gay rights in general focus on ambivalence created by core value conflict (Wilcox & Wolpert 2000; Craig et al 2005).

Core values have also been applied to the study of same-sex marriage. Brumbaugh, et al (2008, 349) examine attitudes toward same-sex marriage in the context of weakening heterosexual marriage. They rely on a three state survey conducted between 1998 and 2000, which measures the strength of two values: the sanctity of marriage and valorization of the individual. Brumbaugh and her colleagues (2008) find that the weight subjects put on each of these values when thinking about the institution of marriage, not their personal experience with marriage, moderates attitudes towards gay marriage. This study is interesting because it is the only study of a gay rights issue which does not examine equality or egalitarianism as a core value.

A final point on core values that is worth consideration is their longevity. Early work on core values noted their stability over time (Almond & Verba 1963). More recent work has also noted the stability of core values, with several authors finding high correlations between measurements one month (Feldman 1988) and two years apart (McCann 1997). Others have suggested that stability may vary across values, with traditional morality more stable over time than egalitarianism (Goren 2005). For an initial test of this work, I hypothesize that frame context matters: Subjects in competing frames conditions are more likely to link their responses to core values than those in the unframed conditions.

This hypothesis rests on the assumption that most subjects have a transitive, and reasonably stable hierarchy of values from which their opinions on specific issues derive. Recent work by Jacoby (2006) suggests that this is in fact the case. By employing an online survey which asked subjects to rank groups of values, Jacoby (2006) determined that the vast majority of subjects exhibited transitive value hierarchies, and that these hierarchies were “directly relevant” to each subject’s issue attitudes.

Another question raised by the literature asks what effect issue frames will have on support for an issue among those who disagree with the frames. Chong and Druckman (2007b, 650) divided the subjects of their ‘urban growth’ experiment into groups based on their general preference for environmental or economic values, and their treatment condition. They then compared each group’s support for an urban growth management proposal. Their findings suggest that frames can reduce value consistency if the frames represent strong arguments from credible sources (Chong & Druckman 2007b). However, Chong and Druckman note that their finding relies on a hypothetical issue. They believe that other issues may have positions which are defined well enough that strong frames which are contrary to subject values may not alter opinion (Chong & Druckman 2007b).

To put these results into the context of this experiment, prior work suggests that subjects who favor equality over morality should be more likely to oppose same-sex marriage and civil unions in the ‘traditional definition/against religion’ condition than those who favor equality in the control because the framed subjects are given strong evidence contrary to their opinion. Extending this logic, the equality-favoring subjects in that framed condition should also express less consistency across other gay rights issues, again owing to the strength of the contrary evidence presented by the frames. Stated formally: Subjects agreeing with the provided frames will link their responses to their core values better than those disagreeing with the frames.

Alternatively, the nature of the same-sex marriage and civil unions issue could prevent this effect because the issue is sufficiently well known that contrary evidence does not provide new relevant information to the subjects. If this is the case, the equality-favoring subjects who only receive arguments against same-sex marriage should resemble those found in the control, both in their opinion on same-sex marriage and civil unions, and in their consistency across other gay rights issues.

4.0 Experimental Design

This survey-experiment is based on the frame construction and question design work of Kinder and Sanders (1990), and the growing literature on competing frames (Brewer & Gross 2005; Chong & Druckman 2007a; Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus 2013; Sniderman & Theriault 2004).

The experiment is a four by two design: four framing conditions are divided into two categories, to control for question order effects on the dependent variables, support for same-sex marriage and civil unions, for a total of eight cells. Two of the treatment conditions provide both support and opposition frames, distinguished by the religious or democratic nature of the appeal. The third treatment condition provides two frames opposing same-sex marriage, and the fourth is the unframed control condition.

To avoid possible priming effects from the demographic variables or other gay rights issues, subjects received the same-sex marriage and civil unions questions first. This was done to avoid subjects answering religious or partisan affiliations immediately before receiving issue frames culled from political elites. Any potential framing effects should therefore be the result of the treatments.

4.1 Issue Frame Selection

The frames used in this experiment were selected from several sources: newspapers and other popular media, Supreme Court briefs, information provided by citizens and lobbying groups, public officials, and prior scholarly research (Brewer 2008; Brewer & Wilcox 2005; Chong & Druckman 2011). These sources identified an 'equality' frame as the most common argument in support of issues dealing with same-sex relationship rights, as well as equal protection in housing and jobs, the extension of civil rights legislation to cover sexual preference, open military service, as well as marriage and civil unions (Brewer 2001; 2002; 2003; Gomes 2003, p. 16; Hull, 2001, p. 218). The overwhelming support for this rationale, to the exclusion of any others, suggests that any research requiring a pro-gay rights argument should acknowledge the equality premise.

Scholars have found more variety in the frames offered by those opposing the extension of rights to gay individuals and couples. Opposition frames include: that same-sex unions are morally wrong (Hull 2001), against a set of religious beliefs (Gomes 2003), or a violation of the traditional definition of marriage as between a man and a woman (Griffiths 2003). The "Save Traditional Marriage '98" campaign in Hawaii also featured a 'majority rule' frame—since the majority of the population opposed same-sex marriages, they should not be permitted (Hull 2001).

This experiment utilizes three of these four opposition frames: against religion, against the traditional definition of marriage, and majority rule. The former two are included because of their conceptual clarity and frequent use in the discourse of national political and religious elites. The 'morally wrong' frame is not used here because it may overlap significantly with 'against my religion'. Further, the 'morally wrong' frame seems conceptually less distinct than the other two frames, which appeal directly to the institution of marriage and subjects' religious views.

The same frames are employed for the analysis of support for civil unions, although their impact may reasonably be expected to differ. A separate test of frame strength using a sample of University of Iowa undergraduates found that the 'equality', 'against religion', and 'traditional definition' frames were less persuasive for the civil unions question than for marriage. Given the implicit focus of these three frames on same-sex marriages specifically, this is unsurprising. The 'majority rule' frame did not lose strength across the dependent variables.

4.2 Data

The data for this experiment were collected between November 8th and 24th, 2008, as part of a national post-election survey collected by the University of Iowa's Hawkeye Poll (2009). The sample includes 680 subjects, with 81 to 90 subjects per cell. Table 1 provides the number of respondents for each cell of the framing and question order experiment. The cells are balanced with respect to salient demographic variables.

The dependent variables for the experiment are support for same-sex marriage, civil unions, and an index of other gay rights issues. Value hierarchies were measured using four questions asking subjects to choose which of two values they believed to be more important to their decision making on matters of public opinion. A definition for each of the values was provided prior to the questions. Exact wordings for the issue frames and core values question are available in Appendix A.

5.0 Discussion: Interacting Value Hierarchies and Issue Frames

To address the hypotheses discussed above, I present crosstabs and chi-squared tests of the control multiple frame environments for both same-sex marriage and civil unions. Subjects are divided by both treatment condition (which frames they received) and their preferred value.²

Table 2 shows the distribution of subjects across each of the values questions in the experiment. A few trends are immediately apparent: each pairing shows a clear preference among subjects for one value over another, and very few subjects were unable to indicate a preference for one value over another. These trends are consistent across both the framed and the control conditions. This suggests that the opinions captured by the values questions are in fact tapping values: they appear unaffected by the different treatment conditions.

Table 3 reports the chi-squared tests for subjects in each of the three value pairings for the civil unions question. Clear differences appear in the number of respondents who strongly favor or oppose civil unions based on respondents' value preferences: just under half of respondents who favored equality to morality strongly favored civil unions while only 10% of those who favored morality also strongly favored unions. The effect holds regardless of whether the respondents are in framed or control conditions, meaning that there is a clear difference in support for civil unions based on the value hierarchies of respondents across all three value pairings.

The effects of most interest for this analysis, however, appear between the framed and control conditions among respondents indicating the same value preference. If the framing environment had a clear priming effect, it should be present in pulling respondents in the direction of their core value (toward 'strongly oppose' among morality-favoring respondents, for example). The chi-squared tests for all three conditions fail to reach statistical significance, however. The closest of these tests is the framed/control comparison for equality respondents, which shows a clear improvement in the number of respondents who strongly favor civil unions in the framed condition. Although the chi-squared test here is not significant, these differences are substantial, and likely would have proved statistically significant with a larger sample.

Table 3 suggests that many subjects are able to link their core value hierarchy to their opinion on this issue without the help of frames. If this is the case, then the framed environments would have little effect on opinion simply because subjects have already made the intended linkage. That said, the number of neutral responses is high across both the control and framed conditions. This suggests either that there is some confusion among subjects for how to feel about civil unions—some might view any state-sanctioned union between homosexuals as inappropriate, while others may believe civil unions are a reasonable alternative to marriage and support them. The same sex marriage question offers a further test of frame context.

Table 4 shows sorting patterns based on respondent value preferences in similar patterns to those found in Table 3: those who preferred equality were more likely to favor or strongly favor same-sex marriage whether or not they received issue frames. Substantial differences appear among equality-favoring respondents dependent on their framed environment as well: respondents in the equality/majority rule condition were substantially less likely than those in the equality/morality condition to strongly favor same sex marriage.

Moreover, Table 4 also offers limited support for the 'frame context' hypothesis in that statistically significant differences appear between framed and control conditions for two of the six conditions: equality-favoring respondents who received the equality/morality frames and tradition-favoring respondents who received the traditional definition/morality frames. In the case of equality, respondents in the framed condition were more likely to strongly favor same sex marriage over those in the control group. For tradition-favoring respondents, those in the framed condition appear to sort toward a neutral position compared to those in the control condition. In sum, these tests show limited support for the frame context hypothesis on the same sex marriage question.

A subset of the value-framing environment pairings used here are those in which issue frames contradict subject value preferences, creating a mismatch between the information the subject receives and their values. The second hypothesis tested here examines whether multiple frame environments are able to weaken the value-issue opinion connection. I test this hypothesis in two ways: by examining subject responses to same-sex marriage and civil unions, and by measuring subject consistency across gay rights issues.

² Only value pairs which are relevant to the multiple frame environment are examined, with the exception of the 'traditional definition/against religion' environment. The inclusion of other values for each framing environment would dramatically increase the number of comparisons and reduce the clarity of the findings.

In both cases the values question used is ‘equality or morality’, and the framing environment is ‘traditional definition/against religion’. To support the hypothesis, I should find that subjects who favored equality are less able to connect their reported value to their position on marriage and civil unions than subjects who favored morality. Also, the equality subjects should also express less consistent answers across the gay rights index of constraint.

Table 5 presents subject responses to the same-sex marriage and civil unions questions. Subjects are split by response to the ‘equality or morality’ values question, and by framing environment (two strong opposing frames or control). Equality subjects express similar rates of nonattitudes as the control, while morality subjects show a reduction in neutral category responses. Across the sample, more subjects opposed same-sex marriage than civil unions. Morality subjects were more likely to oppose both questions than the control, suggesting the framed conditions improved their value-opinion linkage. Equality subjects were less likely to support same-sex marriage or civil unions than the control condition, suggesting that the opposition frames weakened their ability to connect their core value with their opinion on this issue. These findings support the ‘alternate frames’ hypothesis.

6.0 Conclusion

This work has found that subjects were better able to express attitudes toward same sex marriage and civil unions which were consistent with their core value preferences when presented with issue frames consistent with their core value preferences. In practical terms, this means that frames that match respondent value preferences reduce nonattitudes among those who agree. Competing frame environments fair less well, with subject value-opinion linkages improving only in some of the same sex marriage environments.

These findings suggest several avenues for future research. Subjects’ political sophistication may influence their ability to effectively use information presented by issue frames, and comparing subjects on this measure may offer further insight into the persistence of opinions inconsistent with core value preferences. Also, the strength of frames employed (in addition to the type of framing environment), may influence the ability of subjects to make consistent issue-value linkages.

Table 1: Frames and Question Order Manipulations Used, Hawkeye Poll 2008

| | Same-sex Marriage Question First | Civil Unions Question First |
|---|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Control | N=90 | N=90 |
| Equal Rights / Against Religion | N=81 | N=85 |
| Equal Rights / Majority Rule | N=89 | N=97 |
| Traditional Definition / Against Religion | N=81 | N=84 |

Note: Number of cases vary across issues because of non-response.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Values Questions, 2008 Hawkeye Poll

| Frequencies | Equality/Morality | Majority Rule/Equality | Morality/ Tradition |
|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| Equality | 34.6% | 67.2% | -- |
| Morality | 62.0% | -- | 83.8% |
| Traditional Values | -- | -- | 14.3% |
| Majority Rule | -- | 31.3% | -- |
| Same | 3.4% | 1.5% | 1.9% |
| Total | 684 | 674 | 684 |

Table 3: Cross-tabulations of Value-Opinion Linkages, Civil Unions Question

| | Majority Rule | | Equality | | Morality | | Tradition | |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| | Control | Framed | Control | Framed | Control | Framed | Control | Framed |
| Strongly Favor | 4.3% | 8.0% | 21.3% | 15.7% | | | | |
| Favor | 17.0% | 26.0% | 28.7% | 30.6% | | | | |
| Neither Favor nor Oppose | 31.9% | 32.0% | 18.9% | 26.4% | | | | |
| Oppose | 27.7% | 10.0% | 13.9% | 11.6% | | | | |
| Strongly Oppose | 19.1% | 24.0% | 17.2% | 15.7% | | | | |
| N | 47 | 50 | 122 | 121 | | | | |
| Strongly Favor | | | 35.0% | 45.9% | 6.4% | 10.9% | | |
| Favor | | | 25.0% | 24.6% | 23.9% | 23.9% | | |
| Neither Favor nor Oppose | | | 23.3% | 11.5% | 23.9% | 23.9% | | |
| Oppose | | | | | | | | |
| Oppose | | | 6.7% | 13.1% | 22.9% | 19.6% | | |
| Strongly Oppose | | | 10% | 4.9% | 22.9% | 21.7% | | |
| N | | | 60 | 61 | 109 | 92 | | |
| Strongly Favor | | | | | 15.3% | 11.7% | 20.0% | 31.8% |
| Favor | | | | | 23.6% | 21.9% | 36.0% | 31.8% |
| Neither Favor nor Oppose | | | | | 23.6% | 22.6% | 16.0% | 9.1% |
| Oppose | | | | | | | | |
| Oppose | | | | | 19.4% | 19.7% | 12.0% | 22.7% |
| Strongly Oppose | | | | | 18.1% | 24.1% | 16.0% | 4.5% |
| N | | | | | 25 | 22 | 144 | 137 |

Note: Data are from the 2008 Hawkeye Poll. Chi2 test were conducted for each value pairing. Equality/Morality: equality is **not** significant (5.55, df=4, p=.226), morality is **not** significant (1.46, df=4, p=.83); Equality/Majority Rule: equality is **not** significant (3.00, df=4, p=.56), majority rule is **not** significant (5.79, df=4, p=.22); Tradition/Morality: tradition is **not** significant (3.37, df=4, p=.50), morality is **not** significant (2.01, df=4, p=.73).

Table 4: Cross-tabulations of Value-Opinion Linkages, Same Sex Marriage Question

| | Majority Rule | | Equality | | Morality | | Tradition | |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------|----------|--------|----------|--------|-----------|--------|
| | Control | Framed | Control | Framed | Control | Framed | Control | Framed |
| Strongly Favor | 2.2% | 3.9% | 18.7% | 12.2% | | | | |
| Favor | 10.9% | 7.8% | 18.7% | 20.3% | | | | |
| Neither Favor nor Oppose | 17.4% | 25.5% | 15.4% | 24.4% | | | | |
| Oppose | 34.8% | 23.5% | 26.8% | 16.3% | | | | |
| Strongly Oppose | 34.8% | 39.2% | 20.3% | 26.8% | | | | |
| N | 46 | 51 | 123 | 123 | | | | |
| Strongly Favor | | | 28.3% | 41.9% | 6.4% | 7.8% | | |
| Favor | | | 23.3% | 17.7% | 12.8% | 10.0% | | |
| Neither Favor nor Oppose | | | 20.0% | 16.1% | 14.7% | 23.3% | | |
| Oppose | | | 23.3% | 14.5% | 30.3% | 25.6% | | |
| Strongly Oppose | | | 5.0% | 9.7% | 35.8% | 33.3% | | |
| N | | | 60 | 62 | 109 | 90 | | |
| Strongly Favor | | | | | 13.1% | 11.1% | 20.8% | 13.6% |
| Favor | | | | | 15.2% | 14.8% | 20.8% | 31.8% |
| Neither Favor nor Oppose | | | | | 18.6% | 16.3% | 0% | 22.7% |
| Oppose | | | | | 27.6% | 21.5% | 41.7% | 13.6% |
| Strongly Oppose | | | | | 25.5% | 36.3% | 16.7% | 18.2% |
| N | | | | | 145 | 135 | 24 | 22 |

Note: Data are from the 2008 Hawkeye Poll. Chi2 test were conducted for each value pairing. Equality/Morality: equality is **not** significant (4.48, df=4, p=.35), morality is **not** significant (2.94, df=4, p=.57); Equality/Majority Rule: equality is significant (8.53, df=4, p=.07), majority rule is **not** significant (52.40, df=4, p=.66); Tradition/Morality: tradition is significant (9.53, df=4, p=.05), morality is **not** significant (4.15, df=4, p=.39).

Table 5: Comparison of Value-Opinion Linkages: Equality and Morality

| Crosstab Traditional Definition/Against Religion Condition | Equality | | | Morality | | |
|---|----------|-------|-------|----------|-------|-------|
| | Control | SSM | CU | Control | SSM | CU |
| Strongly Favor | 35.0% | 21.2% | 22.6% | 6.4% | 9.6% | 10.6% |
| Favor | 25.0% | 25.0% | 34.0% | 23.9% | 9.6% | 17.3% |
| Neither Favor nor Oppose | 23.3% | 25.0% | 24.5% | 23.9% | 12.5% | 16.3% |
| Oppose | 6.7% | 13.5% | 11.3% | 22.9% | 25.0% | 26.9% |
| Strongly Oppose | 10.0% | 15.4% | 7.5% | 22.9% | 43.3% | 28.8% |
| N | 60 | 52 | 53 | 109 | 104 | 104 |

Note: Values for the control condition come from the civil unions question. Generally speaking, the values for the marriage question resembled those for civil unions, with a slightly greater bias toward the opposition categories. For equality the Chi2 test is significant (26.49, df=8, p=.001). For morality the Chi2 test is significant (23.82, df=8, p=.002).

Appendix A: Frame and Core Values Wordings

Frame Wording and Pairs

| Frame Wording | Short Title | Paired Frame |
|---|------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Some people say that allowing same-sex [marriage or civil unions]...is an issue of equality and should be supported. | Equality | Against Religion, Majority Rule |
| Others say that same-sex [marriage or civil unions] are against their religion and should not be allowed. | Against Religion | Equality, Traditional Definition |
| Others say that same-sex [marriage or civil unions] are not favored by a majority of the population and should not be allowed. | Majority Rule | Equality |
| Some people say that allowing same-sex [marriage or civil unions] should not be allowed because marriage has traditionally been defined as between a man and a woman. | Traditional Definition | Against Religion |

Note: Control condition respondents received the marriage and union questions listed in the first table in Appendix A

Core Value Questions

| Question Wording | Response Options |
|--|---|
| Now I'd like to ask you about some things that are important for our society, such as tradition, equality, morality, and majority rule. First, here is what I mean by these ideas: TRADITION means handing down beliefs and customs across generations. EQUALITY means narrowing the gap in inequalities between members of society. MORALITY means people living according to the rules that constitute decent human behavior. MAJORITY RULE means people abiding by the will of most members of society. All four of these ideas are important, but sometimes we have to choose between what is more important and what is less important. And, the specific choices we make sometimes depend upon the comparisons we have to make. I will ask you to consider pairs of these ideas. For each pair, please tell me which idea you think is most important: | <p>Equality or Morality Equality Morality Equally important (vol) Don't Know (vol)</p> <p>Morality or Tradition Morality Tradition Equally important (vol) Don't Know (vol)</p> <p>Tradition or Majority Rule Tradition Majority Rule Equally important (vol) Don't Know (vol)</p> <p>Majority Rule or Equality Majority Rule Equality Equally important (vol) Don't Know (vol)</p> |

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