On C.D. Broad’s Sensa
Mo Xiao

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine Broad’s sensum theory. I begin by explaining why Broad introduced the sensum theory. The main part considers the nature of sensa in a historical context. Broad argues against the view that sensa are mental in the sense of existentially mind-dependent, but his scrupulousness prevents him from denying their qualitative mind-dependence. Broadian ontological commitment to sensa departs both from Russell’s over-highlighted substantiality and self-subsistence of sensa and from Strong’s denial of sensa as existences. In doing so, I defend my own position on this issue by arguing for a relational phenomenological commitment to sensa in the sense that they cannot exist as independent entities, but merely exist phenomenologically arising from an interaction between physical objects, perceivers and the environment.

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