

## **September 11, 2001 and Change in Pakistan's Foreign Policy<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

*Diplomacy accepts only the national interests of a nation as supreme and a permanent element in international relations. The modus operandi and means to realize these national interests keep changing according to the demands of national and international situation, the perception of national leaders, the long and short term goals and the nature of the crisis faced by a country. Again, the realization of these interests depends upon the maturity, strength and quality of public opinion and leadership. In this regard, national interests are to be envisioned and determined after profound thinking and national debate and discretion is to be used to safeguard them. They are determined in the existing environment with accurately predicting the future. 9/11, 2001 was the event which shook the tectonic plates of world politics and profoundly affected the foreign policies of many states. Keeping in view this scenario the aim of the present study is to answer the question "what were the impacts of 9/11 on Pakistan's internal and external policies especially toward Afghanistan and Kashmir?"*

**Key Words:** 9/11, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Taliban, Pakistan's Afghan Policy, Pakistan's Kashmir Policy and General Musharraf.

### **1. Introduction**

Devastating and fatalistic attacks in New York and Washington (USA) on 11 September (2001) which resulted in the killing of about 2752 people, had a profound and deepening effects on the world because the world at large had been tremendously shocked and jolted (Qazi, October 1, 2001). The UN Security Council passed Resolution No.1368 calling on all member states to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the terrorist attacks, stressing that those supporting and harboring the terrorists would be held accountable. On September 12, 2001 the UN General Assembly too called for similar international co-operation for action to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism ("Musharraf Attempts Tightrope Walk", 2001). George W. Bush's war against terrorism was more or less promptly endorsed by the international community. Bush made it clear that what the United State does would not be "a token act" but a "Continuing Sweeping and Sustained Campaign". Not only the terrorists and their support organizations but also countries which harbor them would be dealt with. He said that he would do it with whatever "it takes".

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In other word it will be a “no-holds-barred operation” (“Musharraf Attempts Tightrope Walk”, 2001). General Pervaiz Musharraf had a difficult task of leading the people of Pakistan through the US led war against terrorism whose time-frame, dimensions and effects on the region were unknown. It was practically a war against the people and country who were helped by Islamabad for about 22 years before September 11, 2001. General Pervaiz Musharraf took 24 hours to decide in consultation with corp. commanders to be with the US when he was confronted with the straight choice by the Americans “you are either with us or against us” (Qazi, November 1, 2001).

Pakistan was forced to fall in line with US foreign policy objective of eradicating terrorism and terrorist from across the world. Musharraf in his address to the nation on September 19, 2001 said “we know that whatever the United State intentions are they have the support of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly in the form of resolutions.<sup>2</sup> George W. Bush and Colin Powel (Secretary of State) held talks and giving time to Musharraf to think over the five demands including giving over bases to the US fighter planes. Similarly on 13<sup>th</sup> of September, 2001 the newly appointed US ambassador to Islamabad, Wendy Chamberlain, met with Musharraf and conveyed him a formal message from President Bush with a list of demand which went as:

1. Stop al-Qaeda operations on the Pakistani border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and all logistical support for bin Laden.
2. Blanket over-flight and landing rights for US planes.
3. Access to Pakistan’s naval bases, air bases and borders.
4. Immediate intelligence and immigration information.
5. Curb all domestic expression of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and allies.
6. Cut off fuel supply to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.
7. Pakistan to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and assist the US in destroying bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network (Hussain, 2007: 36).

The nature and intensity of these demands show the intention on the part of the US that neutrality would not be acceptable to her. These demands required co-operation from Pakistan under threat of dire consequences. Consequently Musharraf immediately succumbed to all the demands of the US government. The submission on his part was so complete that he immediately accepted all the demands made on him and that also without any consultation. He agreed to completely the policy on Afghanistan and abandoned Taliban regime (Khan, 2005: 494; Hussain, 2007: 40).

In his address to the nation, Musharraf said that the nation was passing through the most crucial period of history. Pakistan Air Force was fully alert ready for “do or die” mission. He warned the nation against the wrong decision and said “The choice is between saving Pakistan or the *Taliban* and I am opting for Pakistan. Pakistan comes first everything else come later. Pakistan situation is extremely hazardous and holds potential dangers to Pakistan strategic assets. Never had the country seen such perilous time since 1971. One wrong move at this stage can jeopardize the very survival of Pakistan and allowing the fortress of Islam come to harm would be a disservice to Islam. I call upon the nation to show complete unity and solidarity for any decision which his government may take regarding hunt Osama operation” (“Pervaiz Musharraf Address to Nation”, 2001).

Musharraf consulted services ex-chiefs, politicians, ex-foreign ministers (Hussain, 2007: 35). The state of emergency was declared and Pak-Army was put on “High Red Alert”<sup>3</sup>. Musharraf announced that Pakistan was ready to allow use of its air space for military action against Osama Bin Laden and *Taliban* in Afghanistan, in addition to extending logistics support for the campaign and sharing of information and intelligence. Musharraf said “Pakistan feels that there is evidence which is leading to an association between terrorist acts and Osama (Musharraf, 2001).

The study will attempt to highlight the impacts of the event of 9/11, 2001 on the Pakistani politics, military organization and its interaction with the civilian institutions and specifically on foreign policy of Pakistan towards Afghanistan and Kashmir. The second part of the paper gives a brief summary of the Pak-US relationship.

<sup>2</sup> *The News*, November 20, 2001.

<sup>3</sup> *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), September 23, 2001.

It shows that there is a continuous crest and trough, warmness and coldness in their relations. Both the states are eager to co-operate with each other subject to the condition that the situation benefits and realizes the national interests of both the states. The third part highlights the Pakistan's Afghan policy prior to 9/11. It shows that Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been dominated by the concerns of the leaders in Islamabad to have a friendly and pro-Pakistani government in Afghanistan. This part also elaborates the cost which Pakistan bore while following the pro-Taliban policy. The fourth part shows the impacts of 9/11 on Pakistan's decision making in terms of internal and external policies specifically towards Afghanistan. It shows how the events of 9/11 affected the various institutions including the army, holiest of the institution, of Pakistan. The fifth part analysis the effects of 9/11 on Pakistan's Kashmir policy. It elaborates the pre and post 9/11 Pakistan's Kashmir policy. The sixth part provides the conclusion of the paper.

## **2. *Pak-US Partnership: A Review***

Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, visited the United State in 1950, though he had been firstly invited by the former Soviet Union but the invitation never materialized due to Moscow's geo-political priorities and its intentions to keep closer to India rather than Pakistan. However, Liaquat Ali Khan's visit to the US was well-acknowledged and warmly received by the US administration. The statements during this visit manifested a strong pro-West disposition of Pakistan (Burke, 1973: 119-126). Pakistan alignment policy was shaped by its acute sense of insecurity within the regional context, primarily with India and secondly with Afghanistan and for revival of economy. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact later called as CENTO (1953-54) were signed with the US (Burke, 1973: 164-173; Malik, 2008: 138). This resulted in severing relations with former USSR which extended her co-operation to India on Kashmir question. Despite these pacts, the US continued with its policy of cultivating India in total disregard to Pakistan concerns. The US and a number of other Western states rushed weapons and military equipments to India after the Sino-India border war in October 1962. The divergence between the two states widened as Pakistan was unable to invoke any security arrangement with the US during the course of its war with India in 1965 and 1971. The US imposed an arms embargo on South Asia which adversely affected Pakistan combative effectiveness.

Sharp difference arose between Pakistan and the US when in 1976 Pakistan entered into an agreement with France to acquire a nuclear reprocessing plant. To block the deal, the US took several steps to displease Pakistan as withdrawal of A-7 air craft offer (1977), suspension of new economic assistance and military sales (1977-78) and exclusion of Pakistan from President Carter's trip to Asia (1977-78). The relation highly severed when in November 1979 the US embassy in Islamabad was burnt by mobs and the US threatened Pakistan of dire consequences. The Afghan war (1979) proved a turning point in Pakistan-US relations which moved from the lowest point of 1979 to close political, economic and security ties in the 1980s. The US offered two packages of economic assistance and military sales to support Pakistan's role in the war against communism (Qazi, November 1, 2001).

The post cold war era saw the reversal of Pakistan-US relation. The US was no longer willing to underwrite Pakistan economic development and modernization of its military because it had lost its strategic relevance for the US caused by a host of factors like the Soviet withdrawal and its subsequent disintegration, the absence of competing super power and a triumph of Western values of liberal democracy and free economy. The shifting of the US priorities in South Asia from seeking Pakistan co-operation to non-proliferation and repairing of damage caused to its relation with India due to its Pakistan-Afghanistan policies in 1980, sanctions like Pressler Amendment, economic sanctions in pursuance to nuclear explosions, sanction after military takeover on October 12, 1999 and sanction for its revision of missile technology with China were imposed (Kus, 2002: 115-120). There was a complete stalemate in US relations with Pakistan in Clinton's final year as President. The administration had little incentive to offer with congressional nuclear- and democracy related sanctions against Pakistan. The US 'stick heavy' policy failed to force Pakistan to cooperate (Hussain, 2007: 39).

When President Bush came to power, he raised the issue of terrorism with Pakistan's military ruler. President Bush sent a letter to General Musharraf in February 2001 seeking Musharraf's support in dealing with terrorism. He insisted that al-Qaeda were a direct threat to the US and its interests and that this threat had to be addressed<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 207.

However, there was a clear shift in the policy of the new US administration. Instead of just using the stick, Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested providing some incentives to persuade Pakistan to cooperate. To break the blockage, the US administration moved to pursue a policy of enhanced engagement with Islamabad and also considered lifting some of the sanctions against the military government. But, because of a negative view of Pakistan on Capitol Hill, the idea of lifting sanctions could not make much headway. On 4 August, President Bush again wrote to President Musharraf showing his displeasure over terrorism originating from Afghanistan and requested him to engage actively against al-Qaeda<sup>5</sup>. 9/11 (2001) again changed the Pak-US relation from confrontation to co-operation. The quick U-turn of the American authorities towards Pakistan was no different than the one at the aftermath of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Concern for the state of Pakistan's democracy melted away and the military government was hailed by the West as 'an exemplary country in the fight against terrorism (Hussain, 2007: 40).

### 3. Pakistan's Afghan Policy Prior To 9/11

Pakistan's earlier security perceptions with regard to Afghanistan were shaped by Kabul's territorial claims on KP and Baluchistan. According to Kabul, Pakistan's Pakhtun belt should be given a choice to opt for independence, stay with Pakistan or join Afghanistan. Twice in 1952 and 1962, diplomatic ties were severed in protest against Kabul's interest in Pakistani Pakhtun areas. Islamabad's sensitivity to such claims was heightened by the Baloch insurgency of 1970s which aimed at independent Baloch state (Noor, 2001).

The Afghan *Jihad* that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the Zia regime an opportunity not only to legitimize his unconstitutional regime by embarking on the Islamization of Pakistani state and society, using religion as an instrument for realizing political objectives and mixing religion with politics (Shah, 2012) but also to end Afghanistan's irredentist claims on KP and Baluchistan by ensuring a "friendly" or rather pliable government to eventually take over in Kabul. Coupled with this was the concept of "Strategic Depth" that military strategists argued a "friendly" Afghanistan could provide Pakistan against its main rival India (Hussain, 2007: 38). The country's lack of depth and space, they argued, prevents Pakistan from fighting a prolonged war with India and a friendly Afghanistan could rectify this strategic shortfall (Iqbal, 2001). These objectives influenced Pakistan's strategy throughout the Afghan war and the negotiations Islamabad carried out with Moscow. The idea of "Strategic Depth" had another element in 1990s. A friendly Afghanistan could provide a base where Kashmiri *mujahideen* (freedom fighters) could be trained; a policy that *Taliban* once emerged could follow as Mullah Omar said "We support the jihad in Kashmir" (Noor, 2001).

Another dimension was added to the concept of strategic depth after the fall of the former USSR that for Islamabad a stable Kabul would prove to be the gateway to the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CARs). In the early 1990s, Islamabad dreamt of the economic benefits of trade and gas and oil pipelines emanating from the CARs. However, these economics benefits were contingent on the older problem that had been confronting Islamabad which was quiet then-how to bring a stable, friendly government in Kabul, which could bring peace and stability to the entire country and ensure trade and the construction of pipelines, primarily the proposed pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan's Arabian Sea coast. It was during this period that one can witness "great flip flops" in Islamabad's Afghan policy. Till the sudden appearance of the *Taliban* on Afghan scene, Islamabad's Afghan policy was definitely proving to be a failure. After the Soviet withdrawal, despite Islamabad best effort Hekmatyar failed to gain control of Kabul (Noor, 2001).

When *Taliban* appeared and gained control of Kandahar in 1994, it was a feasible option for Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto and her Interior Minister, Naseerullah Babar wanted to wrest control of the Afghan policy from the ISI and *Jamaat-i-Islami*. It was at this stage that Islamabad did a volte face and switched its support to the *Taliban*. What prompted this switch was also the calculation that the *Taliban* may prove to be more amenable to become part of a broader coalition which will be more palatable to the international community especially to the US. The *Taliban* emergence was tacitly supported by Washington through Islamabad (Noor, 2001).

*Taliban* managed to capture 90 percent area of Afghanistan and pushed their opponent, the Northern Alliance (NA) into a corner. The *Taliban* drew their strength from the majority ethnic Pakhtun. Pakistan from 1996 till 9/11 had been the main anchor for the *Taliban* government.

<sup>5</sup> The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 207.

It recognized the regime and provided considerable economic, political and diplomatic support. In return, she envisioned to exploit “Strategic Depth” of Afghanistan in any conflict with India in future. *Jihadi* organizations in Pakistan also got the support of the *Taliban* to give impetus to *jihad* in Kashmir that had been continuing in Indian Held Kashmir since 1989 (Rais, 2001).

Several factors forced Pakistan to support the *Taliban*, like a large Pakhtun population with affinity for the group; strong religious parties in the country that also supported the *Taliban*; the fact that India supported the Northern Alliance, the *Taliban* opposition; the recognition of the Durand Line by the *Taliban* and the fact that Pakistan hosted the refugees and served as the only window to the outer world (Iqbal, 2001). Resultantly, an international impression was created that Pakistan exercised tremendous influence on the *Taliban* government which proved wrong latter as Mullah Omar was not prepared to listen to his patrons (Pakistan) anymore. The biggest embarrassment came in early 2001 when he snubbed Musharraf’s Interior Minister, Moinuddin Haider, who sought the extradition of leaders of a Pakistani sectarian group who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. They were wanted in several cases of murder and attacks on Shia mosques. Again, in March 2001, Mullah Omar rejected Pakistan’s request not to obliterate statues of Buddha in Bamiyan (Hussain, 2007: 42).

### Cost of Pro-Taliban Policy

Strategically, we assumed that Afghanistan would provide us strategic depth. This assumption took a new color with the rise of the *Taliban* in Afghanistan in 1996. The rise of *Taliban* was celebrated with such fervor in Pakistan as if Afghanistan had become its fifth province. The wrongheaded assumption came screaming at us when none of the Pakistani leader including Musharraf found *Taliban*-run-Afghanistan safe enough to visit it. When Moin Haider, Pakistan Interior Minister, was returning from his only visit to Kabul, he was given a “red-hot send off” with a hail of bullets that he and his entourage dodged by running for cover-so much for strategic depth (Niazi, 2001).

Ethnically, we assumed that *Taliban* rise to power meant the rise of Pashto-speakers in Afghanistan. We celebrated *Taliban* control of Kabul at the expense of its *Dari* speaking majority. By shifting power balance in favor of *Taliban*, we presumably wanted to appease their “brethren in blood” who live on this side of Afghanistan stretching from Bolan to Chitral. This too was an ignorant assumption. The great majority of Pakhtun walls their self off the theology-driven social and cultural code of *Taliban*. Pakhtun are moderate in their theological beliefs, receptive of social change and attuned to the leaders of liberal persuasion associated with Pakistan People’s Party, Awami National Party and Pakistan Muslim League. Pakistani Pakhtun minced no word in blaming Islamabad for stripping Afghanistan off the leaders molded in moderation, liberalization and patriotism value (Niazi, 2001).

Economically, we dreamt of *Taliban*’s sweep across Afghanistan in the hope to boost our “Passage Economy” linkage up Pakistan’s trade route with CARs and beyond Eurasia. Although *Taliban* had been in control of 90% of Afghanistan for over five years, their control did not translate into safe route to and from Central Asia. We also had borne unbearable pain and grief from a mad wave of terrorist attacks whose perpetrators are believed to be based in Afghanistan. Tens of hundred of our fellow citizens have fallen to their lust for senseless violence leaving behind a society driven with ever deepening division (Rais, 2001).

Admittedly, support for the *Taliban* had yielded none of the results Islamabad had hoped for. The *Taliban* had not recognized the Durand line, were not a pliable regime and had not been able to bring the stability which may have led to economic gains (Noor, 2001). What is more evident is that the Talibanization of Pakistani society had begun to take place when extremist religious groups took advantage of the failure of state and civil society to establish democratic political culture, ensure social justice and economic equality (Ahmar, 2001).

### 4. 9/11 and Change in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan

9/11 resulted in great compulsion for Pakistan from the US. It would be no exaggeration to suggest that no section of Pakistani society has been left untouched. The world has been changed not just for the US but for Pakistan too. Islamabad was forced to abandon its two-decade-old foreign policy and join the US in a war against terrorism. Even the holiest of the holy institutions of Pakistan, the Army, could not escape the impact. To mitigate growing western apprehensions after it became evident that he was facing some “internal resistance” from the armed forces in effectively pursuing his new Afghan policy, Musharraf reshuffled the senior hierarchy of the armed forces including the appointment of a new chief of the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI).

He promoted Lieutenant General Muhammad Aziz and Lieutenant General Muhammad Yousaf to the rank of full Generals and appointed them as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Vice Chief of Army Staff (COAS) respectively. He forced Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad, head of the ISI and Lieutenant General Muzaffar Usmani, Deputy COAS to seek premature retirement. By making fresh appointments to five of the nine corps of the Pakistan Army, Musharraf consolidated his hold on power (Reddy, 2001; Hussain, 2007: 45-46).

The Army-led government in Pakistan under a time compressed, Washington induced pressurized environment, and with a firm commitment to offset New Delhi initiative to play a dominant role in the US-led coalition to fight against terrorism alleged to be emanating from training camp in Afghanistan harbored by *Taliban* government in Kabul, redefined national interest (Qazi, September 25, 2001). Musharraf prioritized them to be national security, revival of economy, safeguarding of strategic asset (Nuclear Installation) and resolution of Kashmir issue<sup>6</sup>. These were justification for taking a U-turn in Afghan policy.

The events of 11 September, 2001, brought Pakistan's foreign policy at cross roads. Pakistan's geographical location with Afghanistan and her 22 years pro-Afghanistan policy in general and during the period of 1996-2001 pro-*Taliban* foreign policy in particular pushed her once again into fore front. Threatened with direct political, economic and military consequences for its national security, Pakistan's new unpleasant role for providing all kind of support as implicit in her commitment to the US to facilitate the US intervention in Afghanistan is a shocking but certainly an involuntary reversal of its foreign policy. Pakistan non-cooperation in its dealing with the US at that juncture would have clearly given India a life time opportunity to dismantle the security interest of Pakistan with the help of an angry and wounded US by inflicting a fatal blow to our vital national issue-the bleeding state of Jammu and Kashmir (Pirzada, 2001). So, the choice for Pakistan was between the devil and the deep sea.

Musharraf justified the choice by giving examples from Islamic books as to how even no-war pacts with an enemy could be entered into as a temporary measures by an Islamic State for the sake of political or strategic expediency and could then be reneged later on to defeat the enemy<sup>7</sup>. Defending his new Afghan policy, Musharraf said in an interview to BBC on October 1, 2001 that Pakistan's Afghan policy has always been on a right direction. The past policy was oriented to the supreme national interests and this policy has not met with failure but undergone change in line with the changing circumstances. Policies are enacted keeping the situation in view. Pakistan has reviewed its Afghan policy taking into account the gravity of the current situation. Had the situation been the same prevalent prior to 9/11, Pakistan's Afghan policy would have not been changed as it served our national interests in better way. *Taliban* were occupying 95% of Afghanistan territory and they were the real representatives of the Pakhtun while Northern Alliance did not enjoy that position, being not the real representative of Afghans ("Pakistan to Review Afghan Policy", 2001).

Similarly, while addressing a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the Federal Cabinet on October 1, 2001 Musharraf said that national interest is the only constant factor in inter-state relations as policy to protect it against a continuously changing international environment and he was confident that with the policies being followed by Pakistan in the present circumstances, the country will emerge as a truly progressive, prosperous, strong, stable and Islamic democratic state enjoying peace at home and respect abroad<sup>8</sup>.

President Musharraf had already conveyed the assurance of Pakistan "unstinted co-operation" in the fight against international terrorism to the US administration. Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, was happy with the response from Islamabad. Pakistan, he said on September 15, 2001 after the US National Security Council meeting, had agreed to assist in "whatever might be required to punish the perpetrators of attacks on New York and Washington"<sup>9</sup>. Bush and Powell were fully satisfied with Pakistan's co-operation and sincerity<sup>10</sup>. Pakistan decision can be defended on legal grounds too. The UN Security Council Resolution No.1373 could have been lethal for the very existence of Pakistan. It was a warning that the Council itself stood ready to take further steps in the form of armed force that would not necessarily be limited to self defense.

<sup>6</sup> *The News*, September 20, 2001, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *The News*, September 20, 2001, p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), October 4, 2001, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> *The News*, September 18, 2001, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> *The News*, September 17, 2001, p. 2.

The Security Council equated terrorist acts that claimed a great number of civilian victims, with armed attacks in the sense of article 51 of the UN Charter. Reference the 9/11 catastrophe as “a threat to international peace” and taking of “all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 9/11” reinforce this impression.

Moreover, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which calls for “action with respect to threat to peace, breach of peace and acts of aggression”, the Security Council decided that all member states shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, criminalize the willful financing of such acts, freeze the financial assets and economic resources of persons and entities involved in the commission of such acts and prohibit their nationals or any persons or entities within their territories from making financial assets or economic resources available for the benefit of persons involved in such acts. It also decided that all states shall refrain from supporting anyone involved in terrorist acts, take necessary steps to prevent such acts including early warning to other states and exchange of information, deny safe haven to those involved in such acts, prevent those involved in such acts from using their territories for terrorist purposes, ensure that any person who participates in such acts is brought to justice, afford assistance in connection with criminal investigations or other criminal proceeding relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts and prevent the movement of terrorists by effective border control and other means. Similarly, the UN General Assembly in 1999 adopted the international convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism aimed at individuals that by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wishfully, provide or collect funds with the intention that they should be used to commit terrorist acts (Wasif, 2001).

The U-turn taken by the Musharraf government from pro-Taliban stance towards joining international coalition and adopting a more pragmatic policy vital for the national security complies with both the aforesaid convention and the Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the freezing of Al-Rasheed Trust account, the banning of fund collections on the streets for *Jihadi* organizations, the establishment of rules for the functioning of *madaris* is among the numerous legal and security steps taken directly in conformity with the principles of international law and UN resolutions.

### **Benefits of the Post 9/11 Pakistan's Afghan Policy**

On September 23, 2001 the US President Bush ordered the immediate lifting of sanctions against Pakistan<sup>11</sup>. On September 24, 2001 Pakistan and the US inked \$ 375 million rescheduling deal<sup>12</sup>. In a press briefing on October 29, 2001, the US State Department spokesman talked about the economic package that was being put together for Pakistan to offset the heavy lost entailed for participating in the coalition and assuming a frontline status. It include:-

- a. \$100 million were initially provided to Pakistan and which the administration hoped to increase significantly. In addition, there were \$95 million for ongoing programs in education, health and child labor elimination etc. \$ 30 million in food assistance, \$ 73 million for border security and law enforcement and \$ 200 million from OPIC.
- b. American support to a new three year \$ 2 billion IMF programs for Pakistan.
- c. Support for a range of products and programs through the World Bank and Asian Bank that could total \$ 2 billion.
- d. Support for the rescheduling of part of Pakistan \$ 12.2 billion debt owed to the Paris Club countries on generous terms to ease Pakistan external debt burden.
- e. Ease restrictions on textile items from Pakistan by eliminating duties or lifting quota limits in which trade is currently worth about \$ 138.5 million and explore others ways of improving Pakistan's market access of textiles products.
- f. Other coalition partners contributed their mite. The Japanese lifted their suspensions on aid to Pakistan.
- g. The British wrote off part of their loans and promised some nominal new assistance as had the German.
- h. The EU's agreement with the US on easing restrictions on our textile exports was the major contribution that these western allies of the US could make to bettering Pakistan economic lot and offering genuinely generous debt rescheduling terms if they could not write off current debt (Shaikh, 2001).

<sup>11</sup> *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), September 24, 2001, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), September 25, 2001.

- i. Speaking at Berlin on April 2, 2004, Collin Powell said “Pakistan is our strongest ally in the fight against terrorism and we want to build up and strengthen its institutions.” The US administration initiated the process for designating Pakistan as a “Major Non-NATO-Ally”<sup>13</sup>. It underscores the importance of the relationship and the long term US commitment for extending diplomatic support, economic and technological assistance, co-operation in other related fields and a sympathetic consideration of the request for weapon supply.

### **Cost of the Post 9/11 Pakistan’s Afghan Policy**

Dozens of extremist organizations chanting the slogan of *Jihad* took to the streets against the policy. In the absence of any substantial policy campaign for liberal and democratic values in the society by the mainstream political parties, the Islamist outfits established states within the state. All governments that came to power after General Zia-ul-Haque had to adopt policies of deliberate indifference and apology towards these militants and resourceful outfits (Hassan, 2001). It is said that the economy was going to suffer enormously due to the civil unrest that marked the country ever since attacks. Every day of strikes that led to closure of shops and business damaged our economy enormously. International orders were cancelled because buyers were not confident of the commitment of the Pakistani businessmen to be able to supply goods in time. There has occurred a great divide between the government and the fundamentalists. This has proven to the West that we have extreme fundamentalism within the country and it is on the rise.

Pakistan Muslim League (N) termed Musharraf’s Afghan policy as a total failure. The PML (N) fact sheet said “The formation of a friendly government in Afghanistan after the humiliating defeat of the former USSR and its subsequent withdrawal from there, had blessed Pakistan with a safe 2400 km strategic depth. There were friends and brothers everywhere in Afghanistan and there was no visa restriction on Pakistan, but the wholehearted co-operation of the Musharraf government to the war against terrorism not only led to the formation of anti-Pakistan government in Afghanistan on November 13, 2001 but also cost Pakistan loss of the 2400 km strategic depth. This has exposed the western border of Pakistan to aggression any time in addition to the already barely defended border”<sup>14</sup>.

The four pivotal points of national interest stated by Gen. Musharraf that led to the reversal of Islamabad foreign policy, if scrutinized objectively, do not leave us with an enviable outcome. National security is still threatened by India, who despite Washington’s repeated diplomatic efforts to keep her cool is keeping the option of pressurizing Islamabad open. Moreover, we as a nation is more divided than before the 9/11 which affects national security. The economy has so far suffered more on account of the US led war than it has gained from the removal of sanctions by US and Japan and rescheduling of debts. Our strategic assets are safe but how far was the fear that they were threatened by the US, Israel and India, real or imaginary. Are we not strong enough to safeguard our asset? The Kashmir issue once again is lost in the haze that the war against terrorism has created over the region. Washington’s prime interest at present is to make best use of Pakistan geographical location to achieve her war objective against Afghanistan. She has little interest in the Kashmir issue at present and can’t over pressurize India (Qazi, November 1, 2001).

### **5. 9/11 and Change in Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy**

In the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bush administration categorically declared that “any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the US as a hostile regime (Ahmad, 2001). Expecting Pakistan would not be capable of delivering on the incredible US request for co-operation in its campaign against Afghanistan, India struck hard like a hawk to crush Pakistan. The Indian Prime Minister addressed the nation on September 14, 2001 just three days after the terrorist attacks in the US, demanding a ban on aid and assistance to the countries supporting terrorism (implied reference to Pakistan) claiming further that India had already warned the international community of the danger of militarism going on in Kashmir. Vajpayee’s eagerness to equate the freedom movement in Kashmir with terrorism and its alleged sources in Pakistan is the latest and the most lethal bombardment not only to undo the freedom movement in Kashmir but also to have Pakistan declared as a terrorist state (Pirzada, 2001).

<sup>13</sup> *The News*, April 3, 2004, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), September 19, 2001, p. 3.

To the All Party Meeting on March 22, 2003 Vajpayee said “we should be careful that neither our internal debate nor our external actions deflect our attention or those of the world, away from the real source of terrorism in our neighborhood (Koshy, 2003). The October 1, 2001 attack on the State Legislative Assembly Complex in Srinagar and December 13, 2001 attack on the Parliament in Delhi were one of the most daring terrorist attacks in South Asia in the post 9/11 era. The Indian response was that this was a manifestation of “hate and terror from across the borders”<sup>15</sup>. In an attempt to draw the US to its side against Pakistan, the Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote to the US president G. W. Bush saying that India was running out of patience and asked him to restrain Pakistan from backing international terrorism<sup>16</sup>.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been disputed by Pakistan and India since their inception in 1947. After half a century the two countries have been unable to reach a consensual solution on this bone of contention and their “zero-sum” approach to the issue has allowed virtually no progress. The 1989-90 uprising was seen by the Pakistani authorities as a perfect opportunity to further their case with regard to Kashmir and to bring Indian misdeeds in Kashmir to the international community attention. It was precisely at this time that Islamabad initiated the Kashmir policy of giving moral support to the Kashmiri natives and later on to the insurgents that decided to take up arms for the Kashmir cause. Pakistani authorities saw this as a “low-cost low-risk” policy that they hoped would raise the cost for the Indian side to the extent that it would abandon the Kashmir cause in due course. By bringing the Kashmir issue in the headlines, Islamabad sought to establish moral legitimacy to the claim over Kashmir (Yusuf, 2003).

Over the years, Pakistan has maneuvered to internationalize the Kashmir issue by urging the international community to play a more forceful role in the resolution of what is called as the “core issue” of the conflict in South Asia. Since the nuclearization of the region, Kashmir has become the nuclear flash point. Collin Powell, the US Secretary of State, said that Kashmir is a “central” issue between India and Pakistan which should be resolved through dialogue between them<sup>17</sup>.

Pakistan’s supported its traditional policy on Kashmir based on the UN resolutions till the incident of 9/11 as the only option to resolve the issue. The Security Council has adopted twenty seven resolutions on Kashmir between 1948 and 1971. In all of them what has been emphasized is withdrawal of troops by India and Pakistan and the holding of plebiscite as soon as possible after the troop have been reduced to the bare minimum required for the maintenance of law and order of the state. Notables among these resolutions are: -

- a. Security Council Resolution 47 (1948) of 21-04-1948.
- b. Security Council Resolution 91 (1951) of 30-03-1951.
- c. Security Council Resolution 209 (1965) of 06-09-1965.
- d. Security Council Resolution 307 (1971) of 21-12-1971<sup>18</sup>.

India has been refusing the holding of the UN resolutions on Kashmir and any third party involvement in the Kashmir issue on the basis of Simla Accord (1972) between India and Pakistan. The changed international environment after 9/11 compelled Pakistan not only to take a 180 degree turn on Afghanistan policy but also on Kashmir. Pakistan support to the insurgents though having kept the issue of Kashmir alive has seen no positive results. The support for extremist organizations and the presence of radicals among Pakistani elements had caused great concern in the West. Had it not been for the reversal of Pakistan pro-Taliban policy after 9/11, Pakistan would likely have been on the US hit list of terrorist countries as implied by George Bush “with us or against us” ultimatum. The international community continues to be worry of Pakistan nuclear capability. Moreover, allegations of support of the Kashmir insurgency that India fondly terms “terrorism” has witnessed finger pointed toward Pakistan as a security threat.

President Musharraf declared following his meeting with George. W. Bush in Washington, “Pakistan has a firm position of principle in the international battle against terrorism. We reject terrorism in all its form and manifestation anywhere in the world”<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> *The Indian Express* (Delhi), September 27, 2001.

<sup>16</sup> *The Indian Express*, (Delhi), October 2, 2001.

<sup>17</sup> *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), October 18, 2001.

<sup>18</sup> International Crisis Group, *Asia Report*, No. 68, December, 2003, p. 45.

<sup>19</sup> *The News*, February 14, 2002, p. 2.

In his address to the UN General Assembly, Musharraf consequently claimed that while all forms of terror must be condemned, prevented and fought against, one should not lose sight of the fact that the people who are involved in such incidents are demanding certain rights and have certain aspiration since they are subjected to “state terrorism”. When a people right of self determination and freedom are brutally suppressed by foreign occupation they are driven to put up resistance by all means. Terrorist attacks must be condemned but acts of individuals or groups cannot be the justification to outlaw the just struggle of people for self determination and liberation from colonial or foreign occupation nor can it justify state terrorism.<sup>20</sup>

A brief look at the Musharraf speeches at various international fora in the post-9/11 period would place the then Islamabad views regarding Kashmir in perspective. In an interview to the Arabic Journal “*Jihad Times*” Musharraf, when asked whether Kashmir issue has gone to the back burner in the wake of prevailing situation after 9/11, said “we have set the ball in Indian court, seeking a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the core issue of Kashmir and now it is up to them as to how they respond. But one thing is crystal clear that there would be no durable peace in South Asian region until the Kashmir issue is resolved peacefully once for all.”<sup>21</sup>

In his address to the nation on January 12, 2002 he declared that terrorism in all its form would not be permitted from Pakistani soil. During the televised address he announced the proscription of five fundamentalist groups, taking the number of outlawed group to seven. He banned two groups active in Jammu and Kashmir, the *Jaish-i-Muhammad* and *Lashkar-i-Taiba*. Sectarian terrorist groups, *Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan*, *Tahrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan* and *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad* were also proscribed. He also announced that the *Sunni Tehrik* had been placed under observation<sup>22</sup>. Two sectarian outfits, *Lashkar-e-Jangvi* and *Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan* had already been proscribed on August 14, 2001 (“Pakistan Assessment”, 2003). In the immediate aftermath, security agencies detained over 1975 persons linked to such organizations/groups but most of them were released for lack of evidence (“Pakistan Assessment”, 2003).

In his address to the nation on May 27, 2002 Musharraf said “Pakistan is a responsible state. I said in my January 12, 2002 address that Pakistani soil would not be allowed to be used for terrorism against anybody. I repeat we will not allow this. I also want to tell the world and give the assurance that no infiltration is taking place across the line of control but I want to make one thing quite clear. A liberation movement is going on in occupied Kashmir and Pakistan cannot be held responsible for any action against the Indian tyranny and repression ...let me also assure the world community that Pakistan is doing nothing across the line of control and Pakistan will never allow the export of terrorism anywhere in the world from within Pakistan. Let me also say that Pakistan has taken a very bold step and initiative since my speech on January 12, 2002 but unfortunately we have not seen any positive response from the Indian side.”<sup>23</sup>

On December 18, 2003 Musharraf talked of flexibility in Pakistan traditional policy on Kashmir by suggesting that Pakistan would be willing to go beyond the stated position and that he expected similar flexibility from India. He said “we were for the UN resolutions on Kashmir. However, now we have left that aside. If we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility, coming beyond the stated positions, meeting halfway somewhere. We are prepared to rise to the occasion. India has to be flexible too.”<sup>24</sup>

General Musharraf handling of Kashmir affairs marks a watershed in the sense that it indicated a departure from the traditional stands of successive Pakistani governments. His Kashmir policy had two phases and deserves to be studied much more since it is replete with consequences of immense magnitude. The first phase was the continuation of Pakistan stated position that remained unchanged till 9/11. During this phase he was much more vociferous about the legality of the nature of resistance in the Indian Held Kashmir than the previous Pakistan civilian rulers. By all account, he came out as an overt supporter of *Jihad* in Kashmir.

<sup>20</sup> *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, Pakistan, accessed September 7, 2007, <http://www.satp.org/>.

<sup>21</sup> *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), October 8, 2001, p. 3.

<sup>22</sup> *The News*, January 13, 2002. Most of these groups are the outcome of the Zia-ul-Haque’s Islamization process which have posed serious threats to the internal security and national integrity of Pakistan. For more information about these groups see Shah, J. (Nov., 2012). Zia-ul-Haque and the religious proliferation in Pakistan. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 3(21), 310-323.

<sup>23</sup> *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, Pakistan, accessed September 7, 2007, <http://www.satp.org/>.

<sup>24</sup> *The News*, December 19, 2003.

His position on the issue was hailed by the conservative sections and religious parties as the voice of Pakistan. The military top command did not look favorably to the peace initiatives seemingly because the framework of “Composite Dialogue” tended to treat Kashmir as one issue forming a part of other seven disputed issues to be dealt with in talk during the “Composite Dialogue” that had been started between the two countries in 2003. The talk in Agra summit failed because Pakistani president refused to budge even a single inch of ground on its stated position, which was not acceptable to the Indian hosts (Chaudhry, 2005).

The second phase of Musharraf Kashmir policy started from his speech delivered on January 12, 2002 when he banned operation of the extremist organizations from the Pakistani soil and invited India to talk. The haste and zeal with which Musharraf administration wanted to engage India in dialogue was interpreted as strategic weakness on Pakistan part. After too many but unwanted submissions, India ended its military confrontation with Pakistan and responded positively to Pakistan’s offer for dialogue (Chaudhry, 2005).

Islamabad proposals on how to move forward on reaching an amicable settlement of the lingering Kashmir dispute, have worked a great deal of interest among all sections of the population. Musharraf has picked up the courage to suggest a solution other than implementation of the UN resolutions. He suggested four main points.

- a. The state of Jammu and Kashmir could be divided into seven zones, instead of treating it as one whole political unit for the purpose of eliciting the views of the Kashmir.
- b. These zones should be demilitarized.
- c. Their status should be changed.
- d. The valley may be controlled jointly by India and Pakistan (Matinuddin, 2004).

The opposition has rejected it outright. To them it is the betrayal of the Kashmir cause. However, Musharraf proposals are based on realistic grounds because war is no longer an option as both nations are nuclear powers and cannot afford to enter into a conflict with each other anymore. The Kashmiris are getting tired of militancy and after 9/11 the distinction between freedom struggle and terrorism has become vague. National policies are not sacrosanct or revealed scriptures, which cannot be altered. As long as the objective remains unaltered, the tactics of reaching that goal can vary in harmony with the changing internal and external situation. The cardinal point of Pakistan Kashmir policy was to compel India to accept that Kashmir is a disputed territory and that the Kashmiris must be given their right of self determination. The suggestion made by Musharraf is in fulfillment of the UN resolutions though the manner in which they are to be implemented has been given a new angle.

## **6. Conclusion**

The terrorist attacks on the twin towers in America on 9<sup>th</sup> of September, 2001 have brought about tremendous changes in the international relations and international law. In real sense it has shook the tectonic plates of world politics. Pakistan was no exception to such changes which put all her institutions on vibration. Pakistan under the leadership of General Pervaiz Musharraf quickly assessed the situation and succumbed to the demands of the US led international community without taking the nation into confidence. Pakistan took a U turn in her traditional policies toward Afghanistan and Kashmir; drew her support from Taliban government in Afghanistan (though hesitantly and under severe pressure from the US) and proscribed many extremist organizations helping the freedom fighters in Kashmir.

Musharraf based his decision to join the international war against terrorism on securing four basic parameters namely Pakistan security, revival of economy, defense of strategic nuclear and missile assets and the Kashmir cause. The realist approach was accompanied by futurist vision to secure various fronts of its concern. A nuclear Pakistan, strategically more important with Afghanistan in its neighborhood and an already feeble economy might have become seriously vulnerable to the real consequences of post 9/11 era. On economy front, Pakistan is facing a huge influx of refugees and is the worst victims of post 9/11 attack on Afghanistan in terms of economy and political stability. The likely economic fallout ranging from 1.5 to 2.5 billion dollars may stabilize economy (Hussain, 2001).

The change in Afghan and Kashmir policy and Pakistan efforts to co-operate with the US in the war against terrorism contributed to the emergence of Muttahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) (United Council of Action) as a political force in KP which also made inroads in the National Assembly. The MMA’s victory is perceived to be the reflection of the feeling of hatred prevailing in the Pakistani masses against the West’s belligerent stance toward Muslims and the Bush administration in particular.

It was the first time that foreign policy was a major factor in Pakistan's domestic elections. The US military action in Afghanistan and its repercussions for Pakhtun in Pakistan and Afghanistan was effectively highlighted by the MMA. The JUI was a key supporter of the Taliban, majority of whom are Pakhtun. Consequently, JUI workers started heavy demonstrations after the US started military operations in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Anti-US demonstrations intensified when dead and injured bodies of Pakistani Pakhtun were brought to the KP and Baluchistan. The US was widely perceived as having ignored the welfare of the people and the reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan.

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